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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH
DODGE TO,VN, INC., a Ctah
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
YERNON B. ROMNEY, Attorney
General, State of Utah,
GORDON B. CHRISTENSEN,
County Attorney, Salt Lake
County, and DELMAR L. LARSON,
Sheriff of Salt Lake County,
Defendants and Respondents

Case No.
12044

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment vacating a temporary restraining order and holding that Sec. 76-55-5,
6, and 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, is
constitutional. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of SB 128 which became
1

law and subject to enforcement on May 13, 1969, as
Sec. 76-55-5, 6, and 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953. The
judgment was based upon the determination by the trial
court that the statute constitutes a valid exercise of the
police power of the State for a reasonable and appropriate regulation of the motor vehicle business.
DISPOSITION BY TRIAL COURT
Plaintiff's motion seeking a preliminary injunction
pending a determination of the constitutionality of SB
128 was heard before Judge Bryant H. Croft, and by
memorandum decision dated June 18, 1969, Judge Croft
granted plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
pending a trial of the case on its merits.
The subsequent trial was had on October 20, 1969,
before Judge Aldon J. Anderson. He entered a declaratory judgment on February 27, 1970, holding that
Sec. 76-55-5, 6, and 7 of Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, did not violate any provision of the constitution of the United States or of the State of Utah and
vacating the restraining order previously issued by the
Court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's decision which held that the motor vehicle dealer's Sunday
Closing Law (Sec. 76-55-5, 6 and 7, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended) is constitutional.
2

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The material parts of the statute which are now
challenged are as follows:
Sec. 76-55-5 defines motor vehicles to include "All
vehicles propelled otherwise than by muscular power,
excepting vehicles that run only on rails or tracks, required to be licensed by the laws of the State of Utah."
Section 76-55-6 then provides:
"Any person holding a license under the terms
and provisions of Sec. 41-3-6, who shall carry on
or engage or represent or advertize that he is engaged or intends to engage in the business of buying, selling, exchanging, dealing in or trading in
new or used motor vehicles at retail; or who shall
open any place of business or lot where he attempts to or does engage in the business of buying, selling, exchanging, dealing or trading in
new or used motor vehicles at retail; or who shall
open any place of business or lot where he attempts to or does engage in the business of buy.· ·ing, ·selling, exchanging, dealing or trading in
new or used motor vehicles at retail; or who
buy, sell, exchange, deal or trade in new or used
motor vehicles at retail as a business on the first
day of the week, commonly known and designated as Sunday, is guilty of a misdemeanor."
At the outset it should be noted that:
1. The statute only prohibits sales on Sunday of

vehicles which are "required to be licensed." All
other products and all other motor vehicles can be sold
under the statute.
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2. The statute does not prohibit everyone from sell-

ing licensed "motor vehicles on Sunday." The statute
only prohibits licensed dealers from making such sales.
No one else is prohibited from selling motor vehicles on
Sunday.
3. Even licensed dealers are not prohibited from
selling all licensed motor vehicles, for the statute is
limited to sales at "retail."

4. The statute requires the place of business where

such motor vehicles are sold to remain closed. No other
business of any kind is required to close on Sunday under
the statute.
Plaintiff is a motor vehicle dealer licensed under
the laws of the state of Utah and qualified to bring this
action for a declaratory judgment. Its business was
established in September 1966 in a suburban area of
Salt Lake County for the specific purpose of keeping
the sales agency open seven days a week and in the
evenings. (Record
v I cJ J."fi! sjtie" ef Dw Bich·
1
a
50)
12

,

Plaintiff continued to operate its automobile deal·
ership seven days a week until May 13, 1969, the date
SB 128 became law, at which it it closed on Sundays in
compliance with the law.
Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary injunction
restraining the enforcement of SB 128 pending a final
hearing on the complaint for a declaratory judgment as
to its constitutionality. At the hearing on plaintiff's mo-
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tiou, Judge Bryant H. Croft granted permission to .Max
K. .Mangum for and in behalf of the Church State Council of the Pacific Union Conference of Seventh Day Adrentists, and to Attorney Louis H. Callister, Sr. for and
on behalf of Morris Motors, Provo, Utah, to appear as
Amicus Curiae in the case. After Judge Croft granted
plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, plaintiff
again opened on Sundays until the restraining order was
dissolved and the act was declared to be constitutional
by Judge Aldon J. Anderson. Plaintiff has been closed
on Sundays since the order of Judge Anderson. (Record 356)
Subsequent to the trial and prior to the entry of the
declaratory judgment by Judge Anderson, a Special
Session of the Utah State Legislature enacted HB 8
known as the Common Day of Rest Act. Appellant then
filed a motion for an expanded judgment to include a
ruling as to the effect of the new Common Day of Rest
Act, (which applies to all businesses except automobile
dealers) upon the prior act ( 76-55-5, 6 and 7) which
prior act pertains only to the closing of licensed automobile dealers on Sundays. The motion also included a
request for a ruling in the expanded judgment as to
whether or not Sec. 76-55-6 and 76-55-7 of Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended, has now become discriminatory in view of the new Common Day of Rest Act
(HB 8) since appellant would not have the right of
election of Saturday Closing and Sunday Opening as
permitted in Sec. 5 ( 5) (a) and ( b) of HB 8, and appellant would be subject to criminal penalties and li5

cense revocation while all other businesses would be subject only to injunction. A hearing on the said motion
was had before Judge Aldon J. Anderson on February
27, 1970, however, a ruling on the motion was not made,
and Judge Anderson subsequently entered the declaratory judgment on file herein without any reference to
the motion for an expanded judgment, and that case is
now pending in the Third Judicial District Court as
Civil Number 192872.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
RULED THAT THE STATUTE IN QUESTION IS NOT AN UNREASON ABLE EXERCISE OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWER TO '
REGULATE PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
BUSINESS PRACTICES.
The power of the Legislature to regulate the exer·
cise of property rights and limitations on that power are
much discussed in judicial literature, and the guiding
principles which have received general acceptance in
the cases dealing with these problems are summarized
in 16 AMJ ur 2d Constitutional Law Sec. 314 as follows:
"The State may not, under the quise of pro·
tecting the public, arbitrarily interfere with pri·
Yate business or prohibit lawful occupations or
impose unreasonable or unnecessary restrictions
upon them. The regulations of lawful business is
6

dependent upon some reasonable necessity for the
protection of the public health, safety, morality,
or other phases of the general welfare, and unless
an act restricting the ordinary occupations of life
can be said to bear some reasonable relation to
one or more of these general objects of police
power, it is repugnant to constitutional guarantees and void. If a lawful business is of a beneficial character, and not dangerous to the public,
either directly or indirectly, it cannot be subjected
to any police regulation whatever. The courts will
freely interpose by judicial veto when a lawful
occupation is unreasonably and arbitrarily interf erred with or restricted under the guise of protecting the public welfare." (Emphasis added.)
In the instant case, the trial court, in its decision,
did not identfy the public interest which was being protected when it held that the statute is an industry-wide
regulatory statute, and constitutes a valid exercise of the
police power of the State for reasonable and appropriate
regulation of the motor vehicle business.
It is therefore appropriate to examine the evidence
presented in an effort to determine the legislative purpose for the enactment of the statute and identify the
overriding public interests for which it is claimed there
is a reasonable necessity to protect.

The only testimony presented at the trial by the
State relating to the legislative reasons for the statute
and the public interest which would be protected thereby was that if liecensed automobile dealers are open on
Sunday, it would give automobile professional thieves
and unauthorized dealers an extra day to escape detec-
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tion in the transferring of stolen motor vehicles for which
they had no titles, since the Motor Vehicle Registration
Department is not open on Sundays as indicated by Exhibit P-3. (Record 369, 370)
On cross-examination, the defendant's witness, John
A. Burt, the Director of the Motor Vehicle Business Administration, admitted that as far as preventing thefts
is concerned, that a sale on Friday night or Saturday, is
even worse than a Sunday sale, since the Motor Vehicle
Registration Office is also closed after 5 :00 P.M. on
Fridays and on Saturdays, and that with the established
procedure, where licensed dealers issue 20-day permits
and have 20 days within which to report the sale, that a
Sunday sale doesn't have any effect at all on the process.
(Record 83, 84)
The Utah Supreme Court on several occasions has '
interpreted the permissable range of the governmental ,
power to act in the economic realm, and one of the limitations which the court has imposed upon the legislative
enactments which purport to protect the public interest
is that the enactment must have some substantial and
reasonable relationship to the elimination of the evil it
was designed to correct.
The most recent case considering this matter in detail is Pride Oil Company vs. Salt Lake County, 13 Ut
:2d 183, 370 Pac. 2d 355, ( 1962). The case involved the
power of the State Government by statute to restrict the
size and location of signs advertising gasoline. In find-
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ing that the statute was unconstitutional, the court declared:
''The attack upon these statutes is based upon
the ground that they are an invasion of the right
to own and enjoy property. We have recognized
that this includes the right to sell it; and to let
others know of both the desire to do so and the
price.
"The validity of the appellant's contention
that these rights are not absolute is acknowledged. One who desires to assert them and have
them enforced by public authority must do so in
an awareness that when, in the judgment of the
legislature it appears to be necessary for the protection for some more important interest of the
public which involves safeguarding its health,
morals, safety or welfare, even those basic personal rights may be limited to the extent necessary to so protect the public interest.
"But the pivotal consideration in the problem
before us is that in order to justify encroachment
on these rights, such a dager to the public must
exist and the statute must be such that it will have
sume substantial and reasonable relationship to
the elimination or currection of the evil." (Emphasis added.)
Based upon this test, the automobile dealer Sunday
Closing Act would fail to meet the test of constitutionality since, by defendant's own admission, the closing of
automobile dealers on Sundays would not accomplish the
legislative reason given for its enactment-the prevention of automobile thefts.
The only other suggested legislative reason pre-
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sented by defendants and which came from cross-examination by the state, is that the automobile salesmen are
not covered by the overtime provisions of the Wage and
Hour Laws. (Record 354, 335, 363, 364, 382) However,
many businesses are not covered thereby. The Federal
YV age and Hour Act does not apply to any intrastate
business, and would not apply, for example, to real estate
agents and salesmen. There is nothing inherent in the ,
automobile business which would require that the legislature prescribe a day of rest for automobile salesmen
which does not apply with equal force to many other
businesses. Likewise, the enactment as written would not
correct such an evil, even if it did exist.
Although defendants presented no other legislative
reasons for the enactment, plaintiffs did present evidence
comparing the fact situations as they exist in Utah with
the fact situations which existed in other states which
had upheld automobile Sunday Closing Laws. In the ,
case of Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. vs. Gassert, 127
Atl. 2d 566; 23 NJ 71 ( 1956), the Record established
that the Director of Motor Vehicles had take the position in urging the legislation that Sunday traffic on state
highways, particularly Route 46 as it runs through Little
Ferry and South Hakensack, was impeded and rendered
unsafe by a congestion of car dealers operating on Sunday. Apparently this was one of the reasons why the
New Jersey Legislature believed such legislation would
improve health and safety conditions in New Jersey. In
Utah it does not appear that the evils which the New
Jersey Legislature observed exist. This is substantiated
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by the testimony of Robert 0. Bennett, a police officer
assigned to the Traffic Division, who was engaged to
make a traffic survey. He testified that in the location
of major automobile dealers, including that of the plaintiff while it was open on Sunday, that traffic was lighter
on Sun<lays than any other day of the week. (Record
312, 313)

The brief of Amicus Curiae filed on behalf of defendants, cites extensively from the Iowa case of Diamond Auto Sales, Inc. vs.Erbe, 105 NvV 2d 650 (1960).
In passing the law, the legislative reasons for the law
were available in a legislative report, and the reasons
given were that mechanics were unavailable on Sunday
and the "inaccessability of essential legal documents"
existed on Sunday, and the court found these as valid
reasons for upholding the law. In our case, Mr. Bennett
further testified concerning several automobile dealers
which he visited as to the hours of operation of the repair
shops and the automobile sales departments. He stated
that he found that the repair shops and parts departments were closed by 6:00 P.M. on weekdays, and all
day on Saturdays, whereas the automobile sales departments remained open until after 8:00 P.M. on weekdays
and on Saturdays. (Record 23, 24) Thus closing on Sundays and leaving sales rooms open at other times when
mechanics are not on duty does not reach the problem or
remove the claimed evil.
Also as indicated by plaintiff's Exhibits P-2, P-3,
ancl P-.t., the office of the County Recorder, the Office
11

of the Secretary of State, and the Department of Motor
Y ehicles, the offices where "essential legal documents"
are filed, are closed after 5 :00 P.M. on weekdays, on
holidays and Saturdays and Sundays.
Again, Sunday Closing does not meet or cure the
alleged evil. Likewise, Mr. Everett, Vice President of
Heber J. Grant Insurance Company testified that Ii- '
censed automobile dealers could obtain insurance cover- •
age on Sundays, and that the procedure was the same as
obtaining it on Saturdays and after 5:00 P.M. on weekdays when the insurance offices are customarily closed. ,
(Record 325)
If these should be "evils" which the statute is intended to correct, then it must fail because it permits
automobile sales on holidays and on Saturdays and after
5 :00 P .M. on weekdays.

POINT II
THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY
DISCRIMINATES AGAINST LICENSED MO· ·
TOR VEHICLE DEALERS BY REQUIRING ,
THE LICENSED DEALERS TO CLOSE ON
SUNDAYS, AND BY IMPOSING CRIMINAL
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION OF THE PRO·
VISIONS OF THE STATUTE.
The trial court in its Memorandum Decision stated
that "So long as the legislation is not discriminatory or
in violation of equal protection of law standards, the
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same must be supported by the court." (Record 234) It
is therefore appropriate to examine the provisions of
the statute in detail and evaluate it in terms of the evidence presented, and recognize practices within the State
to determine whether it meets this constitutional test.
'Ve assert that the features of the law which are
identified above in the Statement of Facts where the
statute is quoted in full discriminate against the plaintiff who is a licensed dealer, and that they also discriminate against the product-licensed vehicles-which the
plaintiff sells.
The statute governing registration of vehicles in
l1tah is Sec. /il-1-19, Utah Code Annotated 1953. It
governs both motor vehicles used upon the highway, and
things like trailers which are drawn upon the highway.
There are other sections of the statute which relate to
the licensing of vehicles. Sec. 41-1-24 deals with temporary permits pending registration. Sec. 41-1-36 relates to registration certificates. Sec. 41-1-37 deals with
certificates of title. Sec. 41-1-43 provides for license
plates. Sec. 41-1-18 makes it unlawful for any person to
driYe or moYe an unregistered vehicle upon any highway
if the vehicle is of a type "required to be registered" under the statute. Sec. 41-1-19 then provides:
"Every motor vehicle, combination vehicle,
trailer, and semi-trailer, when driven or moved
upon a highway, shall be subject to the registration and certificate of title provisions of this act;"
Then follow eight specific exceptions. Some of the
13

exceptions are material here. Subsection ( b) exempts all
vehicles which are driven or moved upon a highway only
for the purpose of crossing the highway from one property to another. Subsection ( c) exempts any implement
of husbandry "whether of a type otherwise subject to
registration hereunder or not, which is only incidentally
operated or moved upon a highway." Subsection (d)
exempts any special mobile equipment "as herein defined." The other exceptions might have some materiality, but the foregoing will suffice for the point we wish
to make.
Under these exceptions, a truck or a jeep, or even
an automobile which is the type of
"otherwise
subject to registration" need not be registered under
Subsection ( d) if it is used as an implement of husbandry, and is only incidentally operated or moved upon a
public highway. Thus, if the owner of a golf course, or
a farmer bought a jeep or a truck, but operated it on his
farm and only incidentally across or on the highway,
then this would not be a vehicle "required to be licensed,"
and therefore, it would be outside the prohibition of the
Sunday Motor Vehicle Closing Law. We say this because Sec. 5 expressly says that the term "motor vehicles" as used in the Sunday Closing Act, includes only
vehicles required to be licensed.
A motorcycle, such as a Tote-Gate or any other
trail bike which is to be used for off-highway purposes,
need not be registered, and therefore, can be sold on
Sunday under the statute. A motorcycle which is to be
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used on the highway, cannot be sold on Sunday. A mobile home or house trailer could be sold on Sunday, because it is not a motor vehicle, but a mobile home which
is self-propelled-motorized-could not.
There are many other types of motor vehicles which
do not have to be registered, and can therefore be sold
on Sunday under the statute. Examples would be all
kinds of farm tractors and farm implements, snow mobiles; all kinds of motor vehicles used in construction
work, and only incidentally used upon the highway.
Our point here is that the statute arbitrarily discriminates as to products. A motorbike, like a ToteGote, is
identical to a motorbike like a
Honda. The statute would permit a dealer in off-highway motorcycles, to stay open and make sales on Sundays, but it would require a dealer in comparable highway motorcycles to close. It permits a great variety of
motor vehicles to be sold on Sunday, but it requires licensed car dealers to close. While it would be legal to
sell a jeep for use on a golf course or a farm (where licensing is not required), licensed dealers cannot stay
open on Sunday. We submit that there is no constitutional basis for such a product discrimination between
licensed motor vehicles and all other motor vehicles.
The Statute is likewise discriminatory in that it
does not apply equally to all persons who might sell automobiles on Sunday. It is clear from the statute that only
licensed motor vehicle dealers are prohibited from selling or offering to sell automobiles on Sunday. Everyone
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except licensed dealers may sell on Sundays, and the
evidence shows that cars are extensively offered for sale
on Sundays by people and firms who are not "license<l
automobile dealers." (Plaintiff's Exhibits P-5a, P-5b,
P-5c, P-5d, P-5e, P-5f and P-5g.) The evidence also
shows that sales by private individuals do in fact take
place on Sunday as indicated by the testimony of Mr.
Burt L. Curtis, a notary public, who testified that he
personally notarized from 8 to 12 automobile titles each
year which were transferred on Sundays by private in·
diYiduals who sold their automobiles on Sundays. (Rec·
ord 308) Our point here is that there is absolutely no
constitutional basis for permitting all individuals and
firms who are not required to get a dealer's license to sell
motor vehicles on Sunday, while requiring all licensed
dealers to close. The public interest, if this is the purpose
of the statute, would be better protected from the reverse-that is, letting the licensed dealer stay open, and
prohibiting those who have no license from selling.
The licensed dealer has a regularly established place
of business. He isn't going to sell a car on Sunday, and
then vanish. An individual might do just that. The licensed dealer is supervised by the State of Utah in the
manner in which he operates. Unlicensed corporations
and individuals are not. The licensed dealer posts a
bond, and if he sells a car that has a problem with the
title, the bond protects the buyer. An indiYidual who sells
his car is not bonded, and the buyer has no protection.
Most licensed dealers have repair shops and the ability
to serdce cars from a safety standpoint is certainly much
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better with licensed dealers than with the individual. As
the testimony revealed, the licensed dealers has the
know-how and also has established procedures for obtaining insurance after hours, on Saturdays and Sundays. It is unlikely that the private individual would
have the know-how or the connections to accomplish
this. It simply does not protect the public safety, health
or welfare, in regard to any of these matters, to permit
sales by individuals who are permitted to sell cars on
Sunday without being licensed while closing licensed
dealers.
The defendants have cited the case of Stewart Motor Company vs. City of Oma.ha, 120 N eh. 776; 235 NW
332, ( 1931) as an example of an automobile Sunday
Closing Law which had been upheld in another jurisdiction. An examination of that case, however, reveals
that the distinction we are trying to make here was recognized by the court since, in that case, the Supreme
Court of Nebraska upheld the constitutionality of a city
ordinance which made it unlawful for "any person, firm
or corporation" to sell, barter or exchange a motor vehicle on Sunday.
This case is cited by the Utah Supreme Court in
the case of Broadbent vs. Gibson, 105 Ut. 53; 140 P. 2d
939 ( 1943), as an example of the type of Sunday Closing
Statute directed toward an entire activity. The Utah
Court expressly noted that the Nebraska statute prohibited any person from selling or exchanging cars on
Sunday. 'Vith respect to this type of statute, our court
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also noted that in other cases, courts have closely scrutinized such statutes and held them unconstitutional "unless there was a clear basis for distinction." Here again,
the City of Omaha Ordinance which was upheld is much
broader than Sec. 76-55-6 which is now before this Court
in that that ordinance in Nebraska prohibited any persons from selling or exchanging cars on Sunday, whereas
the Utah Statute prohibits only licensed dealers and does
not apply to other individuals who are not licensed dealers, but who are permited under the Utah Statutes to
sell at least two automobiles per year without being licensed as a motor vehicle dealer. (Sec. 41-3-7, U.C.A
1953.)

Likewise, the problems of carrying on the business
when the offices of record are closed, does not justify
the singling out of the automobile industry, if this is one
of the problems which the statute seeks to reach. There
are offices where titles are registered which affect almost every type of property. Real property titles and
liens against real property titles are kept of record by the
County Recorder. That office doses on Saturdays and
Sundays, but Sunday is the biggest sales day of the
week for real estate sales according to the evidence presented. (Record 307) Liens against nearly every type
of personal property are recorded with the Secretary of
State, and that office is closed on Sunday. It was the
type of considerations such as we have noted above that
influenced Judge Bryant H. Croft to conclude that
there was an element of unfair discrimination in pro·
hibiting sales by licensed motor vehicle dealers on Sun-
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day when he granted plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction against its enforcement in his memorandum decision dated June 18, 1969. (Record 110)

POINT III
THE STATUTE VIOLATES THAT PART
OF SECTION 18 OF SECTION 26 OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
WHICH READS AS FOLLOWS: "IN ALL
CASES \VHERE A GENERAL LAW CAN BE
APPLICABLE, NO SPECIAL LAW SHALL .
BE EN ACTED."
This provision of the Utah Constitution has been
interpreted by the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois with direct reference to a statute prohibiting the
sales of automobiles on Sunday. In Courtesy Motor
Sales vs. Ward, 24 Ill. 2d 82, 179 N.E. 2d 692 (1962)
the Illinois Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting the sales of automobiles on Sunday.
In that case, the Court stated this principle as follows:
"This question is distinct from the question
whether it is reasonable to prohibt Sunday labor
per se, or to allow specified exceptions to the prohibition ... there is a well-marked difference between an ordinance which forbids all secular
business on Sunday, with certain clearly defined
and reasonable exceptions, from one which picks
out one particular business and prohibits it bein.g
exercised on Sunday, but permits all other kinds
of business.
19

"The need for observing Sunday as a day of ·
rest is not unique to those engaged in selling automobiles, nor can we see any way in which the purpose of the Sunday law is promoted by prohibiting such activity that is not equally present in a
prohibtion of other business."
The Court held that the law was in violation of Section 22 of Article 4 of the Illinois Constitution, which is
identical with our Utah Constitutional provisions that
in "all cases where a general law can be applicable, no
special law shall be enacted." To be upheld, the Sunday
Closing Law must be based upon some substantial difference between the situation of the licensed car dealers
as a class, and all other individuals or classes to which it
does not apply. There is no such difference here.
The courts in other jurisdictions have also declared
Sunday Closing Laws prohibiting the sale of motor vehicles to be unconstitutional. In McKaig vs. KaMas
City, 256 S.,i\T. 2d 815, (1953), the Supreme Court of
Missouri held unconstitutional a Sunday Closing Law
prohibiting the sale of motor vehicles on Sunday. In deciding the act to be unconstitutional, the Missouri Court
noted that the law prohibited car sales, but excluded sales
of numerous other commercial items, and made car sales·
men rest on Sundays, but did not make salesmen of other
commercial items rest on Sunday. In writing the opinion,
the Court held:
"There is no reasonable basis for singling out
those people who are engaged in the business of
selling automobiles and excluding those people
who sell the aboYe enumerated articles of mer·
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chandise who are permitted to keep open their
places of business on Sunday and the six named
holidays."
The Supreme Court of Florida in Kelley vs. Blackburn, 95 S.O. 2d 260 (1957) declared a statute making it
a penal offense to "sell any wares, merchandise, goods
or chattels on Sunday" unconstitutional and set aside the
conviction of Kelley for selling a car on Sunday. In
Motor vs. Thompson, 126 S.O. 2d 543, the Florida Supreme Court had before it an ordinance prohibiting the
sale of motor vehicles on Sunday, and in that case the
court held that such ordinance was unconstitutional, as
being unjustly discriminatory between businessmen.
The Arizona Legislature attempted to impose special restrictions on the car industry by a law which required that car dealers have a particular kind of building
and display area for their wares. In Killingsway vs.
W estway Motors, 347 P 2d 1098, the Arizona Court held
that car dealers could not be singled out in that manner
and declared the statute to be unconstitutional.
The Utah Supreme Court has also spoken on this
matter, and clearly committed Utah with those states
holding such Sunday Closing Laws unconstitutional,
and which we submit are the better reasoned cases. In
Ruling on two Sunday Closing Laws, the Utah Supreme
Court has given some definite guidelines. The history of
Sunday Closing Legislation in the State of Utah should
therefore be examined to determine the rules laid down
the Utah Supreme Court. In Broadbent vs. Gibson,
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105 Ut, 53; 104 P.

939 ( 1943), the Utah Court con-

sidered a Suuday Closing Statute which provided:

"Every person who keeps open on Sunday, any
store, workshop, banking house or other place of
business for the purpose of transacting
therein, is punishable by a fine not less than $5.0U
nor more than $100.00."
Exceptions-"The provisions of the preceding
section do not apply to persons who keep open
hotels, boarding houses, bathes, restaurants, bakeries, taverns, livery stables, garages, automotive
service stations, golf courses, bowling alleys, ball
parks, theaters, bathing resorts, ice stations, news·
stands, skating rinks, conf ectionary stores for the
sale of confections only, tobacco stores for the
sale of tobacco, pharmacies or the prescription
counters of retail drug stores on Sunday,
legitimate business of each, or such industries as
are usually kept in continuous operation."
This is one of Justice 'i\T olf e's decisions, and it
treated the subject in depth. It first discussed the vari·
ous types of Sunday Closing Laws, and grouped them
into three categories. First, there are those which require
all businesses to close and are called general closing laws.
The second group are those without general closing pro·
visions, and are directed toward the particular type of
business and compels only it to close, and this is the type
of statute now before this court. In analysing the statutes directed toward a particular type of business, the
court cited a number of cases which held that such stat·
utes are unconstitutional unless there is a clear basis for
distinction.
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In hoiding the statute before the court in the Broad/Jent vs. Gibson case unconstitutional, the Utah Supreme
Court said:
"The exceptions in the Utah Sunday Closing
Law Statute are so broad that they in effect
change the nature of this act from a general closing law with exceptions, to a law aimed, without
sufficient legal reason, at certain classes of business, with a general exception to other classes
which in effect is a grant of a special privilege to
the excepted class, while without legal excuse
denying them to others."
As examples, the Court states generally that:
"Under the portions of the statute designed to
make available certain commodities which fit into
a scheme of recreation, it appears that the statute
also unconstitutionally discriminates between
persons or firms similarly situated. Confectionary
stores may keep open under the statute and sell
soft drinks and confections; grocery stores which
sell the same items must close. No provision is
made at all for ice cream parlors which fit as
readily into a scheme of recreation as confectionary stores; pharmacies may stay open for a legitimate business of a pharmacy store, which business
usually includes more than the compounding of
prescriptions; yet a drugstore which sells the same
itms as a pharmacy store is not granted a similar
privilege, for drugstores may keep open only
their prescription counter."
For these reasons, the court stated that the statutes
in question were unreasonably discriminatory, and that
they were therefore unconstitutional.
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In an apparent effort to get around the ruling of
the court in the Broadbent case, supra, Salt Lake City
passed a Sunday Closing Law under its general police
power wherein it provided that no commodities could be
sold on Sunday, but made specific exceptions of some
commodities. This ordinance came before the Utah Su.
preme Court to test its constitutionality in the case of
Gronlund vs. Salt Lake City, 113 Ut. 284; 194 P. 2d
464 ( 1948).

The ordinance in question provided:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to offer or
expose for sale or sell in or from a place of business located in Salt Lake City, any commodity
upon the first day of the week, commonly called
Sunday; excepting that foods may be sold to be
eaten on the premises where sold; fruits and veg·
etables sold by the producer on the premises
where produced; drugs, medicines, surgical appliances; fresh milk; ice cream and soda fountain
dispensation; candy and confections; bottled soft
drinks; bread and bakery products; ice, gasoline
and oil; tobacco and cigars; dentrifices and toi·
letries; newspapers and magazines; sporting
equipment; beer; nursery products; and parts
and equipment for motor vehicles necessary to be
installed for repair purposes on Sunday, ma,fy be
sold."

The Court declared the ordinance unconstitutional
and stated in part:
"As thus reviewed and as gauged by the grant
of municipal power hereinabove referred to, we
find that the prohibitions of the ordinance bear
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1w reasonable relationship to the objectives to be

accomplished by enactments made pursuant to
such grant. Of this ordinance it can be said, that
there is 1W fair reason for the law that would not
require with equal force its extension to others
that it leaves untouched." (Emphasis added.)

One example the court pointed out is that under
that ordinance any service organization could work on
Sunday, but that any salesman of a commercial product
could not. The court could see no valid reason why the
health and morals of one class of persons needed protection while the health and morals of another did not. In
other words, it is no more strenuous for a ditch digger to
work on Sunday than it is for a salesman of radios or
real estate, yet under the terms of the ordinance, the
ditch digger was allowed to work, whereas the salesman
could not. The privilege thus extended was unequal and
discriminatory, and hence unconstitutional.
\Vhen applying the reasoning of these two Utah
cases to the statute before this court at this time, we find
that it does not meet the standards set forth in either of
the above cited cases.
It discriminates both against commodities and
against businesses by its attempt to prohibit only the sale
of licensed motor vehicles by dealers on Sunday. It does
not prohibit all person from selling cars; it only prohibits licensed dealers from buying or selling cars. All
others may buy or sell cars on Sunday and, as indicated
by the evidence at the trial, the selling on Sunday of
automobiles by unlicensed private individuals is a com25

mon practice in the State of Utah. There is no distinction
between an automobile salesman and a real estate sales·
man, yet, in Salt Lake City, the real estate salesman.
under the statute before the court, is free to engage in
his business on Sunday, whereas the automobile sales.
man is not. The automobile accessory store may stay
open on Sunday and sell tires, motors, batteries and all
other parts for vehicles, and yet, when it comes to sell a
vehicle as a whole, the automobile dealer must remain
closed on Sunday. These examples show the basic un·
fairness of the statute; privileges which are extended to
all those in the community to remain open on Sunday
are denied only to licensed dealers in motor vehicles.
Clearly, there is no legal excuse therefor, as the above
cited cases clearly indicate.
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "generar
and "special" laws in the case of State vs. Kallas, 97 Ut.
492, 94 P. 2d 414, as follows:
"Laws which apply to and operate uniformly
upon all members of any class of persons, places
or things requiring legislation peculiar to them·
selves in the matters covered by the laws in ques·
tion, are general and not special.
"Special legislation is such as relates either to
particular persons, places or things, or to persons,
places or things which, though not particularized
are separated by any method of selection from the
whole class to which the law might, but for such
legislation, be applied." (Emphasis added.)
There is no legal basis for the assumption that li·
censed automobile dealers require Sunday closing leg·
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islation peculiar to themselves. No reasons of health,
morals, safety, comfort or welfare dictate that the Sunday sales of automobiles by a licensed dealer, as distinguished from sales of cars by private persons and
sales of all other commodities by other vendors, must be
banned on Sundays. Sec. 76-55-6 is a special law, forbidden by the Utah Constitution. To justify the state in
thus imposing its authority on behalf of licensed dealers,
it must appear at first that the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of the particular class
(licensed automobile dealers) require such interference.
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting
public interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business or impose unusual or unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations. This measure is not general in its
operation, applying equally to all in need of rest and
recuperation, but extends only to licensed car dealers
and employees thereof, and then only to the sales of
motor vehicles at retail.
POINT IV
THE STATUTE VIOLATES SEC. 7 OF ARTICLE I OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OF UTAH IN THAT IT DEPRIVES
PLAINTIFF OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT
DUE PROCESS OF LA'V BY SINGLING OUT
PLAINTIFF'S BUSINESS AND LIMITING
PLAINTIFF'S RIGHTS TO VEND AND SELL,
AND THAT SAID ACT IS NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF THE POLICE PO,VER, AND HAS
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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we respectfully submit that the right
to engage in any lawful business is protected by the
due process clause and equal protection clause of the
state and federal constitutions. Ruckenbrod v. Mullins,
et al., 102 Utah 548, 133 P. 2d 325 (1943); Smith v.
1'exas, 233 U.S. 630, 34 S.Ct. 681, 682, 58 L. Ed. 1129,
L.R.A. 1915D, 677, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 420. 'l'he right
of a man to labor and conduct a lawful business is subject to the police power, but it cannot be prohibited
in the absence of a compelling state interest. "It is basic
that no showing merely of a rational relationship to
some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly
sensitive constitutional area 'only the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interest give occasion for permissible limitation.' " Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323, 89 L.Ed. 430.
There is no compelling state interest shown in this
case, except that it assists the state in preventing fraud
in dealing with automobile titles to prohibit sales on
Sunday, when state offices are closed. However, as
stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the Pride Oil
case, 13 U t. 2d 183, 370 P. 2d 355 ( 1962) , the statute
must be such that it will have some substantial and
reasonable relationship to the elimination or correction
of the evil. This statute does not, because it does not
prohibit sales of automobiles on Sunday by individuals
or corporations who are not licensed dealers. It does
not prohibit sales of automobiles after hours, on Satur<lars or on holidays, when the state offices are also
29

NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE PROBLEMS OI
HEALTH AND WELFARE.
Every citizen has the inherent right to use his prop·
erty whenever and wherever he sees fit to do so; ever1
citizen has an inherent right to sell and dispose of ani·
property owned by him at any time for any considera·
tion, unless restrained by the legislature in a proper exercise of the police power. A corporation is a citizen for
constitutional purposes such as are involved in this case.
The legislature has no power, under the guise of police
regulations, to arbitrarily invade the personal rights ol
the citizens. Each citizen has the right to engage in a
lawful business which is harmless in itself and useful to
the community, unhampered by unreasonable and ar·
bitrary governmental interference or regulation.
The Supreme Court of the United States enunci·
ated these principles in Smith vs. Texas, 233 U.S. 630,
:34 S. Ct. 681, 682, wherein the court said:
"Life, liberty, property, and the equal protec·
tion of the law, grouped together in the constitu·
tion, are so related that the deprivation of any one
of those separate and independent rights ma)
lessen or extinguish the value of the other three.
Insofar as a man is deprived of the right to labor.
his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn
and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied
the protection which the law affords those who
are permitted to work. Liberty means more _than
freedom from servitude, and the constitutional
O'Uarantee is an assurance that the citizen will·,
b;
n
protected in the right to use his powers of m!D
and body in any lawful calling."
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closed. Prohibiting sales and reqmrmg businesses tr
close on Sundays, while permitting sales at all other
times when the state offices are closed, and permittin,I
sales by everyone but licensed dealers, and permittin1
sales eYell by licensed dealers, if the sales are whole
sale, rather than retail, simply does not reach this par·
ticular evil, if it is an evil.
Finally, there is nothing which can be said abour
the automobile industry and its activities on Sunda!
that cannot be said with equal force as to many othe1
businesses, such as real estate sales, and sales of othe:
properties which the Legislature has not seen fit tr
regulate. Gronlund v. Salt Lake City, 113 Ut. 284, 191

P. :Zd 484 ( 1948).

The Utah constitution prohibits a special law wher
a statute of general application will apply. 'Ve, there
fore, submit that the court erred in holding that the
statute, directed only at a small segment of industr)
is constitutional.
Respectfully submitted,
EDWARD \V. CLYDE &
ROLAND R. WRIGHT of
CLYDE, MECHAM & PRATT
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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